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## **External Preconditions for Civilian Peacekeeping**

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## **EXTERNAL PRECONDITIONS FOR CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPING**

### **Abstract**

Civilian peacekeeping by civil society organisations is an innovative technique to create space for peace, but it is partially still underdeveloped as a field of study. The presence of international civilian peacekeepers may create the conditions for protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict. However, civilian peacekeeping is not adequate for any environment. The existing literature in this field is not analyzing the pre-existing conditions that might affect deployment. This article – defining some general external factors that may bring to the success or failure of a civilian peacekeeping mission – is a first attempt in this direction.

**Keywords:** peacekeeping, civilians, nonviolence, NGO, accompaniment.

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## Introduction

Civilian peacekeeping by civil society organizations is a relatively recent technique to create space for peace. As a field of study, research on the feasibility and efficiency of civilian peacekeeping are present (Schweitzer, 2010, Wallis, 2009, Schirch, 2006, Mahony 2006b, Müller, 2006, Schweitzer et al, 2001), but its key-aspects need further investigation and evaluation. Furthermore, the existing literature shows that civilian peacekeeping has been a field of study involving mainly scholars supporting this technique and just few of them considered the protection impact in a broader framework and understanding (Mahony 2006b). What is more needed, therefore, is to identify a set of external conditions that may affect the deployment of a civilian peacekeeping mission. This article attempts to provide preliminary insights in this direction. It explores which external variables can create a suitable or challenging environment for the deployment of peacekeepers by civil society organizations (CSOs).

Obviously, “create space for peace” (Friesen et al. 2011, Wallis, 2009, Schirch, 2006) is not the same of “create *place* for peace”. Create space means to create the conditions in which the local people committed to peace can work safely and without strong external pressures. Usually, this space is not a tangible place, a geographical location, but it can take the intangible forms of dialogue, absence of threats, human rights protection, or empowerment.

The article is structured in three parts. The next section is an overview of the main definitions and interpretations of civilian peacekeeping in the literature. The following section analyses the data on civilian peacekeeping. The 7 main organisations working with this approach are considered for a total of 25 missions and 13 countries. The deployment countries and periods are cross-checked with 8 external variables (intensity of armed conflict(s), type of armed conflict, murder rate, rule of law, voice/accountability, government effectiveness, international aid workers major incidents, and civilian peacekeepers major incidents). Finally, constants and variables are discussed and interpreted. The 8 variables were chosen because their combination is providing a reliable understanding on the areas of intervention about conflicts, political, social and security issues. All the data are provided by widely-used datasets, as presented in the second part. These datasets are combined for the first time together and the matrix can offer a new glance on civilian peacekeeping missions. The article is based on desk-research and the specific information on any kind of incident in civilian peacekeeping missions is directly provided by the implementing organizations. The insights provided by this article might also be considered as a ground for future empirical investigations.

## Defining civilian peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is mainly considered as an approach aimed at stopping or deterring the overt violence of the parties involved. The United Nations are traditionally associated to the idea of peacekeeping, although ‘peacekeeping’ is not mentioned in the Charter, the founding document of the UN. Peacekeeping missions are based on Chapter VI and VII of the Charter and they are sometimes referred to as operations under ‘Chapter VI ½’. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era in UN peacekeeping. Following the 1992 Agenda for Peace, written by

the then Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, the UN peacekeeping missions notably increased their tasks and – to express the changed scope and size – they are labeled as ‘robust’, ‘complex’ or ‘multi-dimensional’ peacekeeping operations. As a consequence, civilian experts are a significant part of these multidimensional operations working on civilian affairs, human rights, SSR, DDR, monitoring, gender issue, confidence-building, etc. (Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, 2010; Isely, 2010; Heldt, Wallensteen, 2011; Koko, Essis, 2012). However, following the failures of UN peacekeeping in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia in 2000, the Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned the commonly-called ‘Brahimi Report’. The reforms confirmed, at least in theory, the importance of the civilian component to decrease violence and to maintain peace.

Civilian peacekeeping by civil society organizations (CSOs) can interact with these UN missions or with other international organizations or state actors, but they are independent from them. This peacekeeping also shares a civilian active protective impact with the UN human rights field presence (Mahony, Nash, 2012).

Surprisingly, Schirch (2006) and Wallis (2009) have tied the emergence of civilian peacekeeping by CSOs to the ‘failures’ of multidimensional peace operations conducted by the UN and by some regional organizations. However, they miss the point on how UN peacekeeping missions are changed since mid 1990es and how the civilian component is, at least theoretically, more relevant in many missions. Meanwhile, some practical collaborations between unarmed civilian peacekeeping and the UN are already present on the ground, as shown by the work of NP in the Philippines<sup>1</sup>.

What is probably missing is a systematic recognition, conceptualization and systematization of possible space of collaboration (for instance, in which scenarios, with which mandates, etc.). Therefore, it makes sense the conclusion reached by Tshiband (2010: 4): ‘the negative allusion made to UN peacekeeping in the definition of civilian peacekeeping hinders its development as an independent field of research’.

Peacekeeping by CSOs is two-fold: on the one hand, it is a reactive dimension involving the direct physical protection of civilians under threat of violent conflict; on the other hand, it is a proactive dimension involving conflict resolution and diplomatic efforts. This peacekeeping has an array of tools available for applying pressure: moral pressures, political pressures, legal pressures, economic pressures, and social pressures (Wallis, 2009). Furthermore, civilian peacekeepers can act with a “proactive presence”: the presence of international civilians in a potentially violent situation can reduce violence and tensions. This because perpetrators of violence or human rights abusers generally do not want to be seen, caught or identified in a violent act (Wallis, 2009). This approach of proactive presence and accompaniment was pioneered by the CSO Peace Brigades International (PBI) early in the 1980s.

Usually, these international CSOs are receiving some type of invitation or contact with at least one group from the conflict region. However, this aspect is quite complex, as well as the actual relevance of a local CSOs invitation, its implications, and the relations with other actors (Schirch, 2006).

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/fieldwork/all-projects/philippines-project>.

As Wallis described (2009), other expressions are used (“witness”, “monitor”, “unarmed bodyguards”, “human shields”). Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) – another organization working with this technique – is often using the expression “unarmed peacekeepers”, while the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) is labeling its internationals on the ground as “accompaniers”.

### **External conditions affecting the deployment of a civilian peacekeeping mission**

A promising chapter by Christine Schweitzer (2010) is entitled “What unarmed civilians cannot do”. The first sentence sounds remarkable: “Unarmed civilian cannot stop spoilers and determined actors from one party or the other, who want to carry on fighting” (Schweitzer, 2010: 31). Then, the article explains how in some scenarios – like Chechnya – a civilian is just a target. However, few lines later, the author claims that it is pretty the same for military: useless and dangerous to stay there. The idea that spoilers cannot be stopped” appears therefore oversimplified and it is not supported by data or evidences. Eventually, Schweitzer concludes with some general sentences and “what unarmed civilians cannot do” remains vague.

Tim Wallis is trying to provide an answer on timing for civilian peacekeeping interventions (Schirch, 2006), but “accompaniment and presence” are considered valuable in all the phases of a violent conflict, and this is not providing any specific indication. He is inevitably concluding: “Each of the intervention activities may be more or less appropriate and effective, depending on the stages of conflict when an intervention takes place and the ripeness of the conflict. Conflict analysis helps to determine the stage of a conflict and if intervention is appropriate.” (Schirch, 2006: 70).

The existing literature on civilian peacekeeping is therefore almost avoiding the issue of when and where to intervene with this innovative technique. However, is it possible to define a set of external conditions that could affect the deployment of a civilian peacekeeping mission? In order to provide a tentative answer, this article is analyzing all the major organizations and their well-established missions of civilian peacekeeping. In the first table below, the 7 considered organizations are listed with their 25 missions. The missions non-based on civilian peacekeeping principles are not considered. To analyze only well-established missions, another criterion is utilized to filter them: the presence of at least two members for at least two years without interruptions. Some of these missions are combining both civilian peacekeeping and some peacebuilding approaches, but this is not considered a relevant factor for this investigation: the main aspect is a predominant role of peacekeeping techniques.

Then, in the second table, the analysis measures the relationships between the 13 countries of interventions delineated in the first table and 8 country-specific conditions. These 8 variables are: intensity of armed conflict(s), type of armed conflict, murder rate, rule of law, voice/accountability, government effectiveness, international aid workers major incidents and civilian peacekeepers major incidents. These variables are based on the presence and intensity of conflict from UCDP-SIPRI conflict data, the national homicide rates as sourced from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, the full set of the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators and

the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSDB)<sup>2</sup>. The analysis is considering a country only in the periods of a mission deployment. Data on civilian peacekeepers major incidents are obtained by direct interviews to the seven organizations conducted by the author of this article.

*Table 1 – Organizations and country deployments*

| Organization                                    | Country and period  |
|---|---|
| Balkan Peace Team (BPT) <sup>3</sup>            | - Croatia, 1994-2001<br>- Serbia / Kosovo, 1994-2001 <sup>4</sup>   |
| Christian Peacemakers Teams (CPT)               | - Colombia, 2001 – present<br>- Iraq, 2002-2006 Bagdad; 2006-present Iraqi Kurdistan<br>- Israel- Occupied Palestinian Territories, 1995-present <sup>5</sup>   |
| Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR)              | - Colombia, 2002-present <sup>6</sup>   |
| Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP)                      | - Sri Lanka, 2002-2011<br>- Philippines, 2007-present <sup>7</sup>  |
| Operazione Colomba - <i>Operation Dove</i> (OD) | - Colombia, 2009-present<br>- Israel- Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2004-present<br>- Albania, 2010-present<br>- Serbia/Kosovo, 2003-2010 <sup>8</sup>  |
| Peace Brigades international (PBI)              | - Colombia, 1994-present<br>- Guatemala, 1983-present<br>- Mexico, 1994-present<br>- Nepal, 2006-present<br>- Indoneasia, 1999-2010<br>- Sri Lanka, 1989-1998<br>- North America 1992-1999<br>- Haiti, 1995-2000<br>- Croatia, Serbia/Kosovo, 1994-2001 (as part of BPT) <sup>9</sup> |
| Peace Watch Switzerland (PWS)                   | - Colombia, 2009-present<br>- Guatemala <sup>10</sup> , 2003-present<br>- Israel-Palestine <sup>11</sup> , 2003-present<br>- Mexico, 1997-present <sup>12</sup>   |

<sup>2</sup> A specific research or dataset on the “respect” for foreigners is not available. However, a similar perspective is provided by the international aid workers killed, injured and kidnapped (local/national staff has not been considered). AWSDB defines “Aid workers” as the employees and associated personnel of not for profit aid agencies (both national and international staff) that provide material and technical assistance in humanitarian relief contexts. The aid worker definition does not include UN peacekeeping personnel, human rights workers, election monitors or purely political, religious, or advocacy organizations.

<sup>3</sup> The BPT was composed by 11 organizations: Brethren Voluntary Service (Geneva), Bund für Soziale Verteidigung (Minden), Collectif de Jumelage des Sociétés, Civiles de Genève et Pristine, Dutch Mennonite Working Group - ex Yugoslavia, Eirene International, Helsinki Citizen's Assembly Geneva, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Mouvement pour une Alternative Nonviolente (Paris), Österreichische Friedendienst, Vienna, Peace Brigades International, War Resisters International. More information in Müller (2006) and <http://www.peacebrigades.org/archive/bpt.html>.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.peacebrigades.org/archive/bpt.html>.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.cpt.org/work>.

<sup>6</sup> FOR is considering this mission a human rights observation missions. However, the technique applied are completely similar to some of the civilian peacekeeping, e.g., protecting accompaniment (<http://forusa.org/groups/services/peace-accompaniment>).

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/fieldwork>.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.operazionecolomba.it/storia-della-colomba.html>.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.peacebrigades.org/field-projects/>.

<sup>10</sup> As part of the *Coordinación de Acompañamiento Internacional en Guatemala* (<http://acoguate.org>).

<sup>11</sup> As part of the *Ecumenical Accompaniment in Israel and Palestine* (<http://eappi.org>).

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.peacewatch.ch/Projects.3.0.html?&L=4>.

Table 2 –Data

| Countries and period of deployment of the missions            | Intensity of armed conflict (s) <sup>13</sup>                | Type of armed conflict <sup>14</sup>                          | Murder rate <sup>15</sup> | Rule of Law <sup>16</sup>                                | Voice/Accountability <sup>17</sup> | Government effectiveness <sup>18</sup> | International aid workers major incidents (killed/injured/kidnapped/total) <sup>19</sup> | Civilian Peacekeepers killed/injured/kidnapped <sup>20</sup>   |
|---|--|---|---------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Albania, 2010-present (OD)                                    | None   | /   | Low<br>4                  | Moderate<br>-0.49 : -0.44                                | High-moderate<br>+0.08 : +0.13     | Moderate<br>-0.27 : -0.20              | N/A  | None   |
| Colombia 1994-present (PBI, OD, FOR, CPT, PWS)                | Minor: 1964-present, 2003, 2006-08.<br>War: 2001-02, 2004-05 | Internal: 1964-present;<br>Non-state: 2002-05                 | High-moderate<br>31-72    | Low (1996-2000)<br>Moderate (2001-2011)<br>-0.98 : -0.26 | Moderate<br>-0.65 : -0.15          | Moderate-high<br>- 0.24 : + 0. 41      | 0/0/4/4  | None   |
| Croatia, 1994-2001 (BPT)                                      | Minor: 1992-93, 1995   | Internationalized, internal: 1992-93;<br>Internal: 1995       | Low<br>1.9-3.6            | Low<br>-1.19 : - 1.01                                    | High-moderate<br>-0.35 : +.047     | High-moderate<br>+0.6 : +0.31          | N/A  | None   |
| Guatemala, 1983-present (PBI, PWS)                            | Minor  | Internal: 1995-1995   | Moderate<br>20.2-46.3     | Low<br>-1.19 : - 1.01                                    | Moderate<br>-0.53 : -0.20          | Moderate<br>-0.7 : -0.42               | 0/1/0/1  | None   |
| Haiti, 1995-2000 (PBI)  | Minor  | Internal: 1991; 2004  | N/A                       | Very low<br>-1.67 : -1.61                                | Low-moderate<br>-0.76 : -0.87      | Very low<br>-1.46 : -1.21              | 0/0/0/0  | None   |
| Iraq, 2002-2006, Baghdad; 2006-present, Iraqi Kurdistan (CPT) | Minor: 1990;<br>War: 1991, 1992-93; 1995-96; 2003-present    | Internal: 1992-93, 1995-96;<br>Interstate: 1991; 2003-present | N/A                       | Very low<br>-1.97 : -1.43                                | Very low<br>-1.99 : -1.40          | Very low<br>-1.91 : -1.65              | 17/4/9/30  | 4 kidnapped (CPT 2005), among them 1 killed (2006)             |
| Israel / Occupied Palestinian                                 | Minor: 1948-present  | Internal: 1948-present;                                       | Low<br>1.7-4.1            | High<br>+0.81 : +1.06                                    | High-Moderate<br>+0.52 : +0.62     | High<br>+0.97 : +1.55                  | 1/1/1/3 <sup>21</sup>  | 10 injured (5 CPT, 4 OD, 1 PWS) <sup>22</sup> .<br>3 kidnapped |

<sup>13</sup> Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 13/03/27), www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Total recorded intentional homicide, completed, rate per 100,000 pop. Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics 2012, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html> (data available since 1995 to 2010).

<sup>16</sup> Governance Score from -2.5 to +2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance. The values for each country are the minimum and maximum during the missions deployment (data available since 1996 to 2011). Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. It is related to the periods of the missions. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.

<sup>17</sup> Governance Score from -2.5 to +2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance. The values for each country are the minimum and maximum during the deployment of the missions (data available since 1996 to 2011). Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Source: Worldwide governance Indicators <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.

<sup>18</sup> Governance Score from -2.5 to +2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance. The values for each country are the minimum and maximum during the deployment of the missions (data available since 1996 to 2011). Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Source: Worldwide governance Indicators <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.

<sup>19</sup> "Major incidents" are defined as killings, kidnappings, and armed attacks that result in serious injury. Data available since 1997 to 2012. Source: The Aid Worker Security Database (AWSDB), <https://aidworkersecurity.org>.

<sup>20</sup> This variable refers to killings, kidnappings and armed attacks that result in serious injury. Other injuries – e.g., diseases or car accidents – are not considered. For the ongoing missions, dates refer until 31<sup>st</sup> October 2012. All these data were provided by the organizations to the author of this article in November-December 2012.

<sup>21</sup> This data refers to the Occupied Palestinian Territories; Israel is not available in the database.

<sup>22</sup> 6 cases are episodes in which settlement outpost attacked shepherds grazing their flocks on Palestinian land and their international companions. The other two cases are: in 2007 a CPT peacekeeper was lightly injured by an Israeli grenade during a demonstration; in 2008 two CPT peacekeepers were lightly injured by rubber bullets (source: <http://www.cpt.org>).

|   |  |   |   |   |  |  |         |   |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|--|---------|---|
| Territories, 1995-present (OD, CPT, PWS)          |  | Non-state: 2006-07  |   |   |  |  |         | (2002-03, OD, Gaza).                              |
| Indonesia, 1999-2010 (PBI)                        | War: Eat Timor 1992, 97-98; Aceh 1990-91, 1999-05                  | Internal  | Low < 10 (data not available for every year)    | Low (2002-03), Moderate (other years) -0.96 : -0.60             | Moderate -0.44 : -0.08   | Moderate -0.45 : -0.19                                   | 3/4/0/7 | None  |
| Mexico, 1994-present (PBI, PWS)                   | War: 2004-05, 2008-present<br>Minor: all other years               | Internal  | Low-Moderate 8.1-23.7                           | Moderate -0.71 : -0.35  | High- Moderate +0.09 : +0.32   | High- Moderate +0.08 : +0.32                             | N/A     | None  |
| Nepal, 2006-present (PBI)                         | Minor: 1996-2001, 2006, 2007;<br>War: 2002-05                      | Internal: 1996-2006;<br>Non-state: 2007                   | Low 2.3-3.3                                     | Moderate (2006-2008), Low (2009-11) -1.01 : -0.63               | Moderate -0.91 : -0.51   | Low-Moderate -0.79 : -0.65                               | 0/0/0/0 | None  |
| Philippines, 2007-present (NP)                    | Minor: 1992-present<br>War: 1991; 2000                             | Internal  | Low 5.4-6.7 (data not available for every year) | Moderate -0.57 : -0.51  | Moderate -0.16 : -0.01   | High-Moderate -0.12 : +0.07                              | 1/0/2/3 | 1 kidnapped (NP, Basilan Island)                  |
| Serbia / Kosovo, 1994-2001 (BPT); 2003-2010, (OD) | Minor:1991;<br>War: 1998; 1999                                     | Internal: 1991; 1998;<br>Internationalized internal: 1999 | Low 1.2-2.4 (Serbia 2000-10)                    | Moderate (2004; 2006-2010), Low (1996-2003; 2005) -1.31 : -0.38 | Low (1996-99), Moderate (2000-2005), High-Moderate (2006-2010) -1.29 : +0.32 | Low (1996-2000), Moderate-high (2001-2010) -0.92 : -0.09 | N/A     | None  |
| Sri Lanka, 1989-2011 (PBI ; NP)                   | Minor: 1986, 1988-89, 2003, 2005;<br>War: 1987, 1990-2001, 2006-11 | Internal  | Low 4.6-10.2 (2005-10)                          | High-Moderate -0.08 : +0.33                                     | Moderate -0.54 : -0.12   | High-Moderate -0.45 : -0.06                              | 0/1/0/1 | 1 injured (NP, in Mutur by hand grenade shrapnel) |

**Data analysis**

The total number of civilian peacekeepers killed, injured or kidnapped for direct causes of the conflicts is:

killed: 1; injured: 11; kidnapped: 7<sup>23</sup>. The missions affected by these major incidents are 4 out of 25 (16%).

The direct analyses of the single variables are showing the follow:

*Table 3 – Conclusions*

| Variable                    | Relationship with danger for civilian peacekeepers  | Relationship with presence and duration of civilian peacekeeping activity <sup>24</sup> |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| Intensity of armed conflict | Weak correlation (positive)                         | Weak correlation (positive)   |
| Type of armed conflict      | Weak correlation (positive with internal conflicts) | Moderate correlation (positive with well-defined actors)                                |

<sup>23</sup> Those killed while kidnapped are counted under 'killed' total.

<sup>24</sup> The relationship with the duration of civilian peacekeeping activity is can be considered as an indicator for mission effectiveness.

|                             |                                 |                                 |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Murder rate                 | No significant correlation      | No significant correlation      |
| Rule of Law                 | No significant correlation      | Weak correlation (negative)     |
| Voice/Accountability        | No significant correlation      | Moderate correlation (positive) |
| Government effectiveness    | No significant correlation      | Moderate correlation (positive) |
| Respect for foreign workers | Moderate correlation (negative) | Moderate correlation (positive) |

- Intensity of armed conflict. Civilian peacekeeping is present in conflict affected by different intensity. The relationship with the danger for civilian peacekeepers is weak. However, in the majority of the cases, the missions are deployed when the intensity of the conflict is low.
- Type of armed conflict. The relationship with the danger for civilian peacekeepers is weak. However, the majority of the missions are deployed where conflicts are internal (civil wars), between the Government and one or more armed groups. The presence of well-define actors in many areas (e.g., government vs. non-state actors) shows a moderate correlation between these actors and the duration of civilian peacekeeping activities.
- Murder rate. No significant correlation with the general homicide rates in host countries: data are very different. It seems that it is not influencing the well functioning of the missions or the dangers for peacekeeping work.
- Rule of law. Usually low-moderate in the states of deployment, but with some exceptions (Israel, Sri Lanka, and Serbia/Kosovo at the end of the 1990es). No significant correlation with the danger for civilian peacekeepers. Concerning the duration of the missions, the majority of long-term missions are deployed in states with low or moderate rule of law, and it shows the ability of these organisations to work in such conditions.
- Voice/accountability. A correlation with the presence and duration of the missions is evident: voice and accountability are moderate or high in almost all the scenarios (the main exception is Iraq, where the deployed mission encountered severe problems). The correlation with the security of the missions is not significant.
- Government effectiveness. All the mission deployed are in states with moderate or high government effectiveness, with the exception of Haiti (PBI 1995-2000, a quite short mission, more considerations below), Iraq (CPT, short and with huge problems) and Serbia/Kosovo at the end of the 1990es. In fact, with the exception of Haiti and Iraq, the states percentile ranks are always in the 80% with more government effectiveness.
- Respect for foreign workers. This is a very important variable for deployment, duration and security of the missions. The international aid workers data on major incident are showing similar trend in the four states where civilian peacekeepers were injured, killed or kidnapped.

Some additional considerations can be taken into account:

- The major accident of a civilian peacekeeping mission deserves more attention. In November 2005, four Christian Peace Team personnel were taken hostage, resulting in the murder of CPTer Tom Fox and the freeing of the remaining three CPTers in a military operation in March 2006 (Loney, 2011). Following an evaluation phase, CPT relocated its violence reduction work to the Kurdish north of Iraq in late 2006. There, the team works toward accompanying displaced persons home by living in conflicted border regions and

documenting human rights violations against civilian populations<sup>25</sup>. In the last decade, Iraq has been a country with a very low consideration for foreign workers and a high number of major incidents. Beyond it, the government effectiveness and accountability have been both very low. Under these conditions, a deployment of a civilian peacekeeping mission is not supported by its stronger leverages and can result very dangerous for the international personnel.

- A very low consideration for foreign workers and low government accountability has been also present in Chechnya, where Operation Dove tried to be present in 2000-early 2001. However, due to security reasons, they have not been able to maintain a presence and therefore they moved to Ingushetia to work with refugees<sup>26</sup>.
- In the Occupied Palestinian Territories the violence against international aid worker is low (but high against national staff), but for international civilian peacekeepers is high. This data suggest that with a strong government effectiveness and rule of law, international workers are safe if they do not work on sectors with political and human rights implications.
- Concerning Haiti, it should be specified that accompaniment and civilian peacekeeping in general was not the main part of the missions, even if PBI received some requests on it. The core work was mainly based on a peacebuilding approach, in particular on peace education and network-building: “PBI worked in Haiti on a project almost entirely devoted to workshops in nonviolent conflict resolution. The team facilitated workshops with the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church and with rural communities where local land disputes threatened to lead to bloodshed. In collaboration with the UN human rights monitoring mission, PBI also facilitated workshops with Haitian judges. The aim of PBI’s work was to help build a network of local nonviolence trainers so that PBI’s work would become redundant” (Mahony, 2006a: 12).
- Considered the close correlation with aid workers major incidents, there are grounds for doubting that to intervene with a civilian peacekeeping mission in countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan or Iraq – where international personnel is often a target – may be highly safe and effective. However, this aspect might be a challenging topic for future investigations.

## Conclusions

This article has provided some tentative answers on external variables that might affect the deployment of peacekeepers by CSOs. It shows that these peacekeeping missions are almost exclusively deployed for medium-long periods in states with a significant level of voice/accountability, with government effectiveness, with respect for foreign workers and with well-defined actors in conflict. On the contrary, the general level of violence in the country is not a negative pre-condition for the deployment and effectiveness of a mission. The intensity of armed conflict and rule of law show weak correlations.

Concerning the safety of a mission, a first positive correlation is evident with the respect for foreign workers, as well as internal conflicts. At the same time, the general level of violence, government effectiveness, voice/accountability and rule of law has not a direct correlation with danger situations for civilian peacekeepers. The correlation with intensity of armed conflict is

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.cpt.org/work/Iraq>.

<sup>26</sup> This case-study is not considered directly in the table above because the deployment period is shorter than two years.

weak and showing a slightly increase of danger in more intense conflicts. Finally, the correlation with type of armed conflict is weak and could be the focus of future investigation on more specific analysis within the single countries.

Civilian peacekeeping by CSOs is still a relatively recent sector of peace intervention, but some organisations are working on a medium-scale and they have already gained significant experience. On the one hand, practitioners should take time to analyze and evaluate the work done so far in order to improve the impact and the security of future missions. On the other hand, Scholars interested in civilian peacekeeping missions should consider the operations within the broader framework of the civilian protection impact, as impeccably investigated by Liam Mahony (2006b, 2012). This article may provide a first analytical framework for future field research and some insights for ongoing and future field operations. Sure enough, the systematic study of these peace interventions can provide some useful insights and criteria on where and when to deploy missions in the future.

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